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OBSERVATIONS

On the CONDUCT of the
Late Administration;

Particularly, in regard to our
Loss of MINORCA:

And on our
FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS,

Which may have been the fatal
Cause of it.



L O N D O N:

Printed for M. COOPER, at the GLOBE,
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MDCCLVII.

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On the CONDUCT of the

Late Administration;

Particularly relating to our




Jobs of Mr. C. A.

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


LONDON:

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1804.

MDCCCIV.



OBSERVATIONS

On the CONDUCT of

The Late Administration.

THE universal surprise and de-
jection, which appeared upon
receiving the intelligence of the
French landing on the island of
Minorca, must not be forgot;
nor the general murmurs and complaints
against the late ministers, for not sending a
force thither sooner, nor a sufficient one at
last.

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It was justly apprehended, since they were landed, they certainly in the end would be masters of the whole; the difference consisting only in the time employed in it.

To this was added the melancholy observation, of what justly might be expected to be our fate in America; which appeared to be so much neglected, as its chief preservation was to depend, on raising four thousand men, just then enacted to be raised. While the whole attention and efforts of the administration had been exerted for an obvious cause, to create a war on the continent, and avowed as necessary by way of diversion; subsidies were granted for it; in consequence of which, every other means of preserving our own dominions, were neglected.

It was thought proper to take notice in parliament, just before the end of the sessions, that the fleet sent to Minorca, ought and might have been of greater force and sent sooner, since the nation had been for so many months alarmed with that danger; thus called upon, the parliament conductor apologized for his own conduct, and left the blame to be answered for by others; in this situation it became absolutely necessary

sary for their preservation, to direct the storm to some devoted head.

It appears by the letter from the admiralty of the eight of June 1756, that the only evidence and charge against admiral Byng was, an extract of monsieur Galliffoniere's letter to his court, giving an account of the action on the 20th of May. It is an obvious remark on that nation, their celebrating their beaten victories; and of their commanders, for highly coloring their own actions; yet this extract is allowed to be undoubted, full evidence, to condemn and ignominiously punish two admirals unheard. The material part of the extract says; " at half an hour past two
 " in the afternoon, the two squadrons were
 " in line of battle, and begun the engagement. The English consisted of 18 sail,
 " of which 13 were of the line; and ours
 " of twelve ships of the line; and four frigates. The action lasted above three
 " hours and a half, but was not general
 " all the time; the English ships, that suffered most from our broad-sides, got to
 " the windward again out of gun shot:
 " they all along preserved this advantage,
 " that they might keep clear of us, as they
 " pleased. After having made their *greatest*

“ *efforts* on our rear division, which they
 “ found so close, and from which they
 “ were so furiously cannonaded, *that they*
 “ *could not break in upon it*. They resolved
 “ to sheer off, and did not appear again all
 “ the next day, being the 21st.”

Who is there, unprejudiced and uninflamed from personal motives, that does not see from this very account, that our fleet endeavoured to engage closer, and that the French fleet kept on the defensive, conscious they could outfail us.

The common sense of the writers of the news papers, after inserting the extract, made this observation, immediately following it. — That there has been an engagement in the Mediterranean, which has not proved so successful as was expected, is generally believed; but surely all the particulars in the above account cannot be strictly true.

But who is there, that must not be under the greatest astonishment and concern, to find his majesty so far imposed upon, by those who wanted to screen their own conduct, by prejudicing and condemning, unheard, two admirals, since they had no
 other

other knowledge of that transaction, than this very extract; which they sent to him, as a charge fully proved, for which they justly deserved with ignominy to be recalled. The letter of the eight of June from the admiralty to Mr. Byng, says; — “ Sir, “ his majesty having received an account, “ that the squadron under your command, and that of the French, under “ command of monsieur Gallissoniere, “ came to action off the harbour of “ Mahon the 20th of last month, and that “ the French (*though inferior to you in* “ FORCE) *kept before the harbour and* “ *obliged you to retreat.* I am commanded by “ my lords commissioners of the admiralty, to send you herewith an extract “ of monsieur Gallissoniere’s letter to his “ court, giving an account of the action, “ and to acquaint you, that his majesty is “ so much dissatisfied with your conduct, “ *that he has ordered their lordships to recall yourself and Mr. West.*”

It appears by the whole tenour of this letter, as if his majesty received another account of the action, than is contained in Gallissoniere’s extract; and it is easily guessed from whom; for it says, in his majesty’s name, *that the French (tho’ inferior to you in force) kept before the harbour, &c.* No such

such thing appears in the extract; it names the number of ships of the line, and frigates on both sides. But even that very Frenchman did not boast of his inferiority of force, that the great genius, who presided over all our naval affairs, should make that conclusion; considering the apprehensions he must be under, is not surprising, since it was become so necessary. The long and repeated intelligence, which was received here of twelve ships of the line with five frigates, sitting out at Toulon, was despised; and he always had asserted, they could not man above six or seven of the line. The names of the twelve ships were well known, the number of their guns and weight of metal, and what number of men they ought to carry to venture an equal engagement; when he knew the twelve ships of the line, and the frigates were sailed to Minorca, from that time he must stand self convicted, the French had the superior force, and the English the inferior.—— But some body must be sacrificed to the odium of the people, that others might escape. The question then arose, whom it should be; Gallissouiere's extract did not sufficiently point it out; for it speaks of a part of our fleet, *making their greatest efforts on their rear*

rear division, but could not break in upon it. By this very extract therefore it appears, that one of our admirals did his duty. As it could not possibly be known here which commaded that part of our fleet, to make sure work of it, and for fear of mistaking on whom to lay the blame of the whole conduct of this affair; they were both unheard, ignominiously disgraced; though one certainly must have done his duty, and might rather have deserved praise. Is not the very motive, for their sheering off, described and accounted for in these express words; *after having made their greatest efforts on our rear division, which they found so close, and from which they were so furiously cannonaded, that they could not break in upon it, they resolved to sheer off.*

Does not this plainly declare, the English attacked and wanted another sort of engagement; and the French still avoided a closer engagement, instead of taking the advantage of that part of our fleet, which had suffered by their furious cannonading, and made, as he says, *our ships go to the windward.*

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The advantage they had, in the cleanness of their ships, was known to them there, and to us here: does it not then appear plainly from this very state of it, that they preserved and depended entirely upon this advantage, and that they avoided a more close and general engagement, and the English pursuit, to bring them to it, was unattainable, while they would avoid it. What then had the English to do; but what he says, in consequence of it they did. *Finding they could not break in upon it, they resolved to sheer off.* From what did they sheer off, but a fruitless attack for want of a superior force. Is that *a retreat from the French, keeping before the harbour of Mahon.*

When we consider this extract, as the only account his majesty had received of the action on the 20th of May; we must surely be under the greatest concern, and desirous to know, who informed and advised him, or by whose direction these words, in the letter of the eight of June, from the admiralty, were inserted, *that the French, though inferior to you in force,*
kept

kept before the harbour and obliged you to retreat. For Galiffoniere's extract does not mention, where the engagement happened; why then assert from this very extract, *that he kept before the harbour and obliged him to retreat.* Which is the whole and every part of the charge, upon which two admirals, unheard, were condemn'd to be suspended. For any thing that appears by this extract, he might have executed his orders, relative to fort St. Phillip's, before the action ——— and landed lord Robert Bertie's regiment, with the other forces, the new general, deputy, deputy governor. Where then would have been his superiority, they having determined on the 25th of March, that the force designed at first to be sent, was too great, therefore had order'd the marines to be discharged from that squadron; how inferior must ours have been then, according to their orders and their knowledge, as a battalion was not sent from Gibraltar. And the truth has since appeared, that he was before the harbour, and left it to go and engage the French fleet ——— It was therefore impossible they should have any knowledge or intelligence of so false and groundless a fact; which, they charge his sacred majesty with having received

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ceived an account of, to justify themselves, and sacrifice Byng to popular rage. But what is still most astonishing at this very hour, that from the horrors of their own conscious guilt, they sent the very extract of Galissoniere to our admiral, as the only charge of full undoubted facts and evidence, that could not be questioned or denied; therefore they deserved the sentence already passed on them here unheard. In what light now must appear, all their intelligence of dreadful invasions, under their colouring, for their own views and purposes; from hence will not we attend, does not all Europe attend, to what the king of France says in his declaration of war, of the late ministers imposing on his majesty.*

The whole of this transaction was not only a most amazing credibility in a French ac-

* It is equally notorious, that the English fleet had been making prizes of French vessels more than six months, when the first battalions, which his majesty ordered to the sea coast, began their march. If the king of England *should ever reflect on the falshood of the reports* which have been made to him concerning these facts, he will not surely forgive those, who have betrayed him into the Assertion of what is so far from being true, that it cannot *by any artifice be rendered specious.*

count,

count, but attended with such a precipitancy to cast the load on others, that they would not stay for any accounts, that might come from other parts, but seemed to dread most the account of the action from our own fleet; which account formerly was ever deemed necessary to ground our judgment upon. But it was become absolutely necessary to divert immediately the national rage and resentment from themselves.

The two admirals thus prejudged and sentenced, tho' it appeared one must be innocent, and only both thus used for fear of some unhappy mistake in the person — The next and most material consideration, for the preservation of those, whose conduct was so justly blamed thro' this whole affair, was on which to turn and direct this popular flame and rage. The consideration therefore must have been, whom they most dreaded, should be the innocent person — The letters from admiral Byng at Portsmouth, were tacitly upbraiding, and proving, the admiralty had not used their *utmost endeavours* to fit him out sooner, after he was appointed to his command; and that there were many unnecessary delays, which ought to have been prevented by

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them

them — He too was positively assured by the great naval authority, the French could not fit out above six or seven sail of the line: — He too was possessed of those strange, perplexed, absurd, confounding instructions, which could serve more to justify themselves, than an admiral, if he was unsuccessful — But above all, he was guilty of a high and unpardonable crime in his letter from Gibraltar, of the fourth of May, in which he accuses the admiralty of the greatest *negligence*.* Byng therefore was necessarily doomed to popular fury — No sooner could they single him out, than they pursued him to destruction by, ballads, elegies, pictures, grubs, bonfires, executions, which were all remarkably encouraged and propagated by ministerial tools, and persons in ployment.

From hence it was easily forseen, by the least experienced, that the contagious flame would

* Mr. Byng's letter, 4th of May, from Gibraltar: where he mentions not only the French having 13 men of war, but says that there are but few or no stores in the magazines to supply any of the Squadron, that may be in want of them; and it appears by a letter that I received from the store-keeper and master ship-wright, that the careening wharfs, store-houses, pits, &c. are entirely decayed.

would spread over the whole nation ; which prejudices, with resentments thus raised, impotently exerted in revenge for national dishonour, and the greatest national loss, would, without evidence or any regard to justice or reason, require from them a real execution, to justify their own actions, importance and understanding. History shews ages are necessary to obliterate national prejudices, when the populace of a nation have once been raised to acts of resentment, by their ministers, or governors, be it either for their safety, or to screen themselves ; which, tho' so often practised, will scarce ever fail them ; for by this means the people are made a party in the cause, and each individual thus imposed on, thinks himself interested, that it should not be proved, he was or could be imposed on——The multitude therefore never can conceive, that public authority, for the information of the people, has been prostituted and corrupted to inflame their minds ; what no reality in the laudable contention, who should show the greatest discovering sagacity, with the most unbounded resentment to singularize themselves for the love of their country. Their pride would be too much mortified to think, they could be so far imposed upon, that
one,

one, who might have been innocent, could possibly be executed in effigy, without deserving it, or that it could only be matter of diversion — In all times shows and ceremonies, both in religion and politics, convince the gross of the people more than sense or reason.

We live in a time, when we can more coolly consider and examine the horrid shocking rage of the nation, on account of the popish plot, in the reign of Charles the second; we now see nothing but the grossest absurdity, falshood and contradiction in every part of the accounts of it; we now are at loss to perceive a possibility of any connected idea, which could so infatuate the nation. Oates, Bedlows, false evidence sacrificing so much innocent blood, to the dishonour of our ancestors, is not sufficient to warn us from the same frantic fury, whenever it again shall be artfully raised and administered to us.

Having engaged his majesty's sacred name to screen themselves, and lay the odium on others unheard, on the boasting extract of a French commander to his court, they fell securely into their regular, uninterrupted

terupted course of business, to make the most of incidents that might arise, to provide and reward their dependants, supporters and flatterers; one therefore was made an admiral, when there was no hopes of saving Minorca — For him it was a sufficient merit, that *we* had sailed round the world together — His promotion became a sufficient merit for all his seniors to be made admirals also, or to be otherwise provided for, tho' they had not merit enough to be employed as such; even Broderick, who was commodore of five men of war sent to the assistance of Byng, though so far trusted, was not now thought proper to be depended on, for the sake of the pretence of making a favourite an admiral, as it was no longer doubted now, we should certainly lose Minorca; the government of it must likewise be lost; and the governor, tho' we had so many months notice and apprehensions for that place, neither was, nor designed to be there — but general Stuart was sent to supply that want in some respect — It is well remembered, that when the Spaniards last besieged Gibraltar, lord Portmore the governor was there. But now the government of Minorca was exchanged for that of Gibraltar; may we not ask, what new dangers, at that juncture, so
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particularly threaten'd that place and from whence? — Would not this highly justify admiral Byng, when he could have no prospect of success in another engagement with the French fleet, to do his utmost to *cover Gibraltar?

While they were thus sporting and indulging themselves with the incidents that arose from the public calamities, pluming themselves on their great success, and political impositions on his majesty and his people, news came from the Dutch merchants at Malaga, to their correspondents in Holland, and from thence was sent here, which disturbed their golden plundering dreams, and threatned to rob them of a murdering sacrifice for their preservation; the purport was, that the action on the twentieth of May was a victory on our side. — What could be more odious, more ominous! — We must be prepared against that dreadful condemning sound, to all our actions and desperate impositions — This alarming news was published in the papers, before the express arrived from Byng — Losing gamesters often after the
loss

* *Cover* was a criminal word, necessary to be obliterated in his letter.

loss of a great stake, desperately stake
 their whole fortune—The dreadful sound
 of victory must be no more ecchoed in our
 ears ; above all, that noxious word must be
 obliterated in Byng's letter——The glory,
 the honour of that day's action, between
 the two nations, must be given up and sa-
 crificed to our own preservation, to justify
 the orders of the eight of June, in direct con-
 tradiction to the only intelligence they had
 received, in which the French claimed no
 victory, while the superiority of the French
 appears undoubtedly from that very account
 sent them by Byng. But tho' it is properly
 no victory, the honour of the day ought as
 zealously to be contended for by our mi-
 nisters and this nation, as it could be by the
 French, but self-preservation was the first
 principle. Every part of Byng's letter,
 that might do him honour, was castrat-
 ed ; and every part that had the least
 tendency to justify him from crimes, he
 did not know he was or could so much
 as be accused of, was garbled to answer
 their own private purposes ; the public au-
 thority of the Gazette was prostituted to
 publish it, as admiral Byng's letter, by
 which he appeared to witness against him-
 self, and stand self-convicted and condemned
 —— The scripture itself may be thus abo-
 minably

abominably tortured and mangled into blasphemy: the fool said in his heart there was no God, leave out the words *the fool said in his heart*.

A conscious dread, that even this would not be all sufficient to impose on the public, made them to venture still farther and more desperately; for they took upon themselves to order comparative lists to be made, and printed in the Gazette, as following an information received from Byng himself; these two lists, in opposite and comparative lights, shewed the number of ships and guns in both the French and English squadrons, the killed and wounded on both sides in each ship; by which it appeared, that none were killed or wounded in admiral Byng's, therefore designed and calculated for that very purpose, that from thence every one must be convinced he was a coward, and that they had the gift of foreknowledge. The very manner of publishing these lists, as if coming from him, heightened the flame, and was thought a full and sufficient evidence of his treachery and correspondence with the French; for how else could he come at their list of killed and wounded? for the list of the killed and wounded in our fleet, it was plain and certain,

tain, that it came from him; the enraged mob even urge it at this day, as a proof of his treachery, since he is acquitted of cowardice; and nothing but his blood will satisfy them — These lists upon the face of them, appear to be collected from several papers and accounts, picked out, collected, and placed in this very inflammatory, and false light, to direct the storm against Byng — Thus that confidence, which ought ever to be sacredly preserved between the crown and people, in the communication of national affairs, was infamously prostituted by the ministers to serve their own vile bloody views.

This infamous account, as well as something else relative to these transactions, will be for ever recorded in our history, and no less shock our posterity, than we are by reading the accounts of the Popish plot.

But there is still another point of view, which must be considered, as to the insidious and treacherous motive of it. For we see his majesty's name is made use of, as having received an account of the action *off the harbour of Mahon, the 20th of last month and that the French, THOUGH INFERIOR TO YOU IN FORCE, kept before the harbour,*

and obliged you to retreat. If his majesty's name has been used in this manner without his knowledge, the late ministers are highly criminal ; if the ministers gave his majesty this information, they were equally criminal, for Gallifsoniere's extract says no such thing — Byng's trial must convince all the world of the falsity of it, and of the criminal imposition on his majesty and the nation; for it now appears beyond possibility of a doubt, the English had the honor of the day, and that the French retreated from them ; and notwithstanding all the advantages they had to attack us, they would not even suffer us to come to a close engagement with part of our fleet only, which it evidently appeared, we were desirous, and endeavoured to do. — Who now can or will defend the assertion, which is made in his majesty's name ; *that the French, THOUGH INFERIOR TO YOU IN FORCE, kept before the harbor, and obliged you to retreat.* It will be remarked and long remembered, that before they received any account of the action, they declared Byng would not fight, forestalling consequences to clear themselves.

It ought to have been mentioned before, and ever remembered on this consideration ;
that

that the council of war held at Gibraltar on the fourth of May, gave it as one of their reasons, for not sending a battalion; *that the Toulon Squadron, by the best accounts the council have received, is at least equal in force, if not superior to that under admiral Byng*; which was received here a few days before they received Galliffoniere's extract. This must have been imputed as a high crime in the council of war; this was received at the same time with that desponding letter of Byng's, from which they so preposterously and falsely concluded, he would not fight; though it might be as yet doubtful, it was highly probable, they would have the superiority by the time he could come to an engagement, considering the distance of time from the sending of that intelligence to Gibraltar, and that of his arrival off Mahon; and that the admiralty had just cause to expect it would, appears by a letter dated the 21st of May from the office. I will not mention the various reasons assigned for such declarations, but there is one so obvious, that I must take notice of. — They knew at that time the great force the French had landed on the island of Minorca, and that our fleet could not preserve it — The fault theretore was to be their certainty of his not fighting enough; not their total neglect

glect of Minorca; they knew likewise at that time, the force of the French squadron, the names of the ships, number of guns and weight of metal, and the number of men that were necessary for their complements; and the advantage they might have in putting on board, any number of soldiers from the island.

But to put beyond the possibility of a doubt, how justly grounded their knowledge was of the improbability of any success attending Byng, from the justly dreaded superiority of the French, the letter from the admiralty office to admiral Byng, dated the 21st of May, remarkable from being the very day after the action, says, " Sir, " My lords commissioners of the admiralty having received *certain intelligence*, " that the French are fitting out more " ships at Toulon, they have *thought proper* " *per* to reinforce the squadron under your " command, &c."

The ships were the Prince George of 80 guns, the Hampton-Court, Ipswich and Nassau, of 64 guns each, and the Isis of 50 guns. Why was not equal credit given to the certain intelligence they had constantly received for above seven months; why,

why, since they would not send a squadron sooner, did they not at last send such an additional force with admiral Byng. From hence we may observe, that those, who were so certain, the French could not mann above seven men of war, were now apprehensive, the French were able to fit out and mann an additional naval force to join Gallifoniere——Self convicted and condemned for not sending a squadron sooner to save Minorca, nor a sufficient strength at last, they had nothing left to screen themselves, but to impose on their royal master, and to abuse the national confidence, in what is published in the Gazette by authority. The names of the ships, the number of guns, and the number of killed and wounded on both sides, has ended in blood, as was designed, which it is hoped, will not atone for their crimes, or serve to screen their iniquity; for whoever will read Byng's trial, will find it proved, beyond the possibility of an excuse, that several of our ships in the line of battle had not the number of guns, which the Gazette has asserted they had; and to crown the glory of this atrocious act, they insert, that mighty ship of war, the Fortune Sloop, with its fourteen popp guns, and count her heavy cannon, to prove our superiority over the French in number
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of guns; by which it is plainly and fully proved, the French were inferior in force to Byng, for these mighty popp guns tell in the numbers, no matter how trifling the weight of the ball is, or whether equal to a French cannon of 42 pounders, for of that weight they were taken out of our ships; the heaviest of ours were but thirty two pounders——We had however with the good ship Fortune, the greatest number of ships and guns; without the great ship Fortune the number of ships had been equal. Every man of sense, who had the least knowledge of the naval forces of the two powers, knew from the moment they heard the number of ships and of guns carried by each ship, that the French fleet was superior to Byng. And this was known here long before our account of the action came——It therefore became absolutely necessary to apply to the passions and ancient prejudices of the nation, that one English man of war ought to fight and beat two French men of war, but here we had more ships, more guns——Therefore nothing but rank cowardice or a treacherous correspondence could prevent the enemy from being blown out of the sea.

Compare

Compare that mighty line of battle ship, the *Deptford* of 50 guns and 280 men, with a French ship of 50 guns. Compare the *Captain*, which, the *Gazette* asserted, carried 70 guns and was manned by 480 men only, whose greatest guns are but 24 pounders, with a Frenchman of war of 70 guns. Behold the *Invincible* now at *Portsmouth*, she is but a French man of war of 74 guns. We are always deceived, in reckoning our men on board our ships, according to the nominal complement, without making any deductions for the fictitious men. The number borne should only be reckon'd.

Formerly our ships, for the number of their guns, carried equal weight of metal with a French ship of the same number. But now a French ship of the same number of guns is greatly larger, and carries a much greater weight of metal and a greater number of men—so that she is every way a ship of much superior force to an English ship of the same number of guns; except some few as have been lately built or altered, and put upon an equality with them in that respect. But how abandoned and profligate is it in this present case, to reckon our ships of the old establishment, and compare them

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to the French ships of the same number of guns, as if the weight of metal of our guns was equal to the French, and not allow for that vast increase of force and superior power in the French ships. Another thing to be considered, in regard to ships in the point of superiority, is the condition of the ships and men, the French were clean and just come from their Port; the bad condition of ours appears on Byng's trial—— But to return to our faithful Gazette, by which they obtained two strings to their murdering bow——while the populace greedily swallowed both, as one and the same demonstrated proof of two facts and propositions; the most absurd and self-contradictory in their own nature, and in terms to be made one of. The merciful conclusion therefore at present is, since it was not cowardice, it must be treachery, and his blood must atone for it.

But this incoherent garbled letter, which was to pass as a letter from an officer of great rank and long service in the navy, must be declared to be unintelligible——since it was so contrary to the predetermined resolution, how the action must have passed to preserve ourselves. Tho, he might not be a good writer in other respects;

respects; yet surely he was capable in the sea language and terms to have conveyed a clear, explicit account of a naval engagement. And however expressed, it could not be grossly wanting to carry on a connected idea of the whole affair; to one especially of the same profession.

The express that brought Mr. Byng's letter had travelled through all Spain, attended by the joyfull sound of victory; till it came to the Admiralty. There the whole letter struck them with despair and astonishment; but it is well remembered, for it immediately perspired, how they vented their rage against that odious word, victory; which was well known before the Gazette was published; and I no sooner perceived, that word was omitted in the Gazette, but I justly suspected the letter would be garbled of what made most against themselves, and in favour of Byng, to serve their own detestable interest and preservation.

The very sound of the word, victory, coming from our own fleet, who were actors in the very engagement, though it might not be strictly true, yet was it a joyful sense, warmly expressed for the honour

and glory of the day, and together with the whole letter, a full and unanswerable proof, that Galliffoniere's boasting account was false; much more so the consequences they drew from that account, as facts, upon which two admirals, unheard, were punished by an ignominious suspension.

The Question therefore would naturally be, what must we do for our own preservation, with this horrid, dreadful letter. A cunning able secretary could have suggested no better expedient, than to let him make it unintelligible—Byng's letter must be garbled of those noxious, highly criminal accusations and proofs it contained against others, as well as of what made for his justification—To this let there be, with the most iniquitous malice made up and taken from several accounts, a state of the English and French fleets in the engagement, with the numbers of the killed and wounded on both sides, that the whole might appear to be in Byng's letter, then his business is done—Thus calculated, thus published, it was attended with a frantic rage, that exceeded their warmest expectations, though not their most sanguine wishes—The rage, the fury, the shews, the ceremonies of executions, which arose to such a height of infatuation,

fatuation, was owing to this Gazette, and their dependent tools expensively enflaming it, daily furnishing fuel, as they were justly sensible it could not last long ; that truth in the end might prevail, and the true copy of the letter be published, by which the nation might see their infamous imposition on them——It therefore became absolutely necessary for them to continue and keep up the flame, by the same arts it had been raised, of imposing shews and ceremonies. From this motive arose the frequent ill usage and punishment of admiral Byng before his trial, the numerous, the pompous guards to convey, to protect, to secure him ; the story of his endeavouring to escape, served as a shew and a delight to the mob, to see the iron bars on the top of his chimney——But these and many more of this nature are trifles, compared with another stamp of authority given to justify the rage of the people, from the forgery in the Gazette. For undoubtedly the secreting any part of a letter, which is given in evidence of a crime, for which a man has been, or is to be punished, especially that part which tends to his justification, or proves his innocence, is certainly the most audacious and criminal imposition on a nation, which infatuates and deludes them by means of such false evidence or forgery : still more
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so where the parts of the letter so secreted, would sufficiently prove the guilt of others.

The people now wonder, how they could be so grossly imposed on, whilst nothing but the grossest impositions can attract their attention, from their extravagant, hurrying pursuit of amusements, and dissipation; Shews therefore, and panicky terrors alone can strike their imaginations. The pompous effigy, with the parade from the Tower, attended by the lower slaves in office, the expensive scattering away of money, were undoubted proofs of his guilt beyond any reasons or arguments. What office has now the department of paying for mobs and bonfires, we know not; since the time of the late memorable bill of the Post-office, by whose account it appeared, a very great sum of publick money was expended for such important services of government; this example, this mockery of justice was followed by the nation with pleasure and diversion — They had lately experienced to what a height, they could raise our passions by the grossest impositions. The opportunity of involving the nation again in a continent war was greedily seized. The minister had forty years experience that
nothing

nothing was too absurd to impose upon this nation: the last war was fresh in his memory, and in that only he was successful as to us. He would not permit us for his own interest, for the sake only of his obtaining power, that the treaty of Hannau should be concluded. He refused every offer for peace. Necessity at last, when we had no more money, when we were within a month of a general bankruptcy, he permitted us to accept of a peace. None of the favourite expectations were obtained by it. But such extraordinary care was employed on an old obliterated debt, that if we read the history of those times, will appear a very odd one; that he forgot to renew one of our treaties of commerce with Spain. Which occasioned again another more definitive treaty. There was in it a reference to the former about an article of account; which ended in the South-sea company's having nothing for the debts due to them; and the receiving only 100,000. instead of their annual ship. But we don't yet know what was done as to the Hanover debt.

The peace therefore was by no means satisfactory, nothing was talked of afterwards,

wards, but the recovering our finances; and then for another war again; elaborate calculations were made and published, to prove how much better it was for the publick not to take off any taxes, when they reduced the interest of the national debt; for we should be so much the sooner in a condition for it again. One of the given periods, for such a recovered situation, was Christmas 1756; but the French seeing what we were doing, and knowing our designs, had not the politeness to stay so long.

For no sooner was the war concluded, but the minister laid his scheme, for what must infalliably in a few years produce another, the settlement of Hallifax. Our own brother, knowing the consequences, declared against it; he treacherously imposed upon those but who still loved the true interest of their country, in preference to all Germanic systems and favourite measures; and were glad for once to employ the treasures of this nation, for so beneficial a purpose as they were made to be believed it would be.

I will not now enter upon a deduction of facts, treaties, memorials, nor on
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what has been published concerning it; nor take any notice of some extraordinary assertions and transactions relating to the river Ohio. But may I humbly presume only to ask, what will appear extremely absurd to this nation, except a very few——Is *Hallifax* erected on the dominions of this nation, by virtue of the treaty of Utrecht, founded on the treaty of Breda——If it should hereafter appear it is not, to whom do we owe this pernicious fatal war?

Then in what a high light will appear the able, artful conduct of France, who permitted us, and never questioned our right to that place, but then most masterly turned it upon us; since that is the Acadia you have a right to, and claim by virtue of the treaty of Utrecht, it is a very ancient Acadia, which they then confine to its then ancient little territories, there they unanswerably retrenched themselves, since we must upon any account be permitted to acknowledge, that Hallifax was not in that, we so justly had a right to.

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All our replies then would be nothing but blundering on, plunging deeper in the mire, producing many strong and glaring proofs against ourselves, when we departed from that great, only useful important Acadia of the treaty of Breda, for a trifle, to us, in respect of the other. Great sums we have expended on Halifax, much greater would it cost to keep it long, and in the end is nothing but a dreadful uninhabitable place. Our laudable zeal supported and carried on the delusion. The minister knew his secret intention of the use and design of the whole. If that settlement had never been made, or as soon as the error was perceived, we had abandoned Hallifax, we now should have had no war to have answered his desperate purposes, tho' infallibly tending to our utter ruin and subversion of all that is valuable to this once powerful, flourishing nation.—They insisted upon things being in the treaty of Utrecht, which were not in it; — At last, when too late to be of any service to inform them better, even supposing them desirous of it, they ridiculously boasted, they had discovered, at the bottom of an old trunk in the secretary's office, the Latin treaty.—A war plainly appeared to

to be determined by the instructions to Braddock. By the answer of the 22d of January to monsieur Mirepoix, from thence we were intrepidly hurrying to Germany to raise forces; the Hessians, the Russians; which last treaty is founded on a reference to the treaty concluded between us the 11th. of December 1742, and is explanatory of one part only. It must must never be forgotten that in every begining of the last war, instead of our rightly endeavouring to accommodate the disputes between the king of Prussia, and the queen of Hungary, we formed a plain of a treaty for a partion of his dominions, and that Russia was depended on as a party to that treaty. By this last we stipulate they should have their subsistence from, and the plunder of some country, not named indeed; but surely it cannot be France, and *for the charges they have been at* and shall be at, we engage to pay them 100,000/. a year in advance, till the proper time came for giving them half a million a year; moreover we take upon ourselves the obtaining a free passage for them through Poland. It must be observed that in the last war we had a subsidy treaty with Saxony, for supplying us with his troops; he took our money as long as he could employ them to obtain his share of the parti-

tion of the king of Prussia then in execution. That over, he broke his bargain, and would not let us have them for our own real service — But we were supplied by Hannoverians — Of what use has been the great sum of money we have paid in subsidies, since the peace, to Bavaria and Saxony. The memorial of his Prussian majesty, to which is annexed the original papers found in the cabinet of the king of Poland, without our knowing THE SECRET ARTICLE OF ALL, together with what has been done, and is doing in Germany, and the part Russia has taken in it, too fatally illustrates the whole — These negotiations being happily accomplished, they were immediately followed with orders for seizing of all French ships, without any declaration of war, which inevitably must plunge us into one. But how was this nation to be dragged into an approbation of such a continent war again, after our last fatal experience it could not be done, unless it was by something so very gross, so prodigious, that it should surpass our understandings. A new and wonderful discovery was therefore made, that dark long nights were the best to invade us, with a greater number of ships and men, than ever was heard of before for such a design; for they had undoubted intelligence

intelligence of 700 flat bottom boats with 500 men in each, which amounted to no less, than 350,000, men — The panic from thence was so strong, that every thing must be approved of — The good people could not sleep quietly in their beds from these dreadful apprehensions, till they had 14000 German watch-men — Then sunk this terrible mighty armado.

Then it could not be believed that this mighty, new created naval power of France, was able to man above six or seven ships at Toulon — Which will our posterity admire most, the credulity of the nation, or the credulity of the ministers? — Is it not the highest infatuation, to depend so absolutely on the corruption of some, on the reviving, the remaining, imaginary terrors of others — Even in the very instant of a fact, which shews their sort of undoubted intelligence — Yet to our astonishment, tho' they placed such an undoubted absolute credit, in the boasting account of a French commander; we are to have no regard at the same time, for the most solemn declaration of the king of France himself; as is every declaration of war, since it is an appeal, justifying the motives of it to all Europe: in which he says, *if the king*
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of England should ever reflect on the falsehood of the reports, which have been made to him, concerning these facts; he will not surely forgive those who have betrayed him into the assertion of what is so far from being true; that it cannot by any artifice be rendered specious.

Yet all their hopes must be placed in the blood of Byng's attoning for all negligences, and in the marvellous, the undoubted terrible intelligence of 700 flat bottom boats—Shall we therefore be surprized at their modesty; if they should use their utmost endeavours to send our own forces into Germany at last.

The King of Prussia, wisely foreseeing, from his knowledge of our treaties with the Hessians and Russians, reflecting on the continued plan of a partition of his dominions, with what passed in England by ministerial imposition, the threatened pretence of danger to Hanover, from France. The strong prevailing arguments of the ministers here, in the direction of the other assertion, that it was absolutely necessary for the preservation of this country that there should be a war of diversion, to waste the treasure, to dissipate the forces of France. So consummate was our

our abilities, that we thus treated the politicks of France as those of arrant drivilers; by proving it was their interest to avoid it, save their forces and treasures to wound us in our most mortal parts. He was experienced too by our motives and conduct in the last war, that nothing was too absurd, too gross, that we would not swallow from ministerial imposition, if once a pretence could be found, to kindle a war on the continent.

He therefore, to cut short all dilatory negotiations, which might be designed for amusement, sent to his minister here, orders to conclude a treaty with us, on a plan drawn by himself: it could not be refused, for then the mask would have been torn off, and the nation would not bear to be any longer imposed on. Hanover was safe by it; then the king of Prussia's dominions would have remained the only object.

The event has been, the King of Prussia put an end to views of certain aggrandisements; but above all, to that one which was most justly dreaded, as it might be the most fatal to us. Ought we not therefore

fore from gratitude, wish him success, and in this critical conjuncture support him, as far as is consistent with our poor remains of wealth, our own preservation; and for preventing for the future the pursuit of past favourite measures.

No sooner was this treaty, on the 16th of January signed, than the Imperial minister here, spoke of it in a high alarming tone; great apprehensions arose what would be the conduct of the two Emperesses, to one of which we paid 100,000*l.* *in advance*. Would they lay aside the long conducted plan of partition, or would they make *a new one*. How might the court of Vienna from resentment, disappointment, sacrifice something more material to us, to pursue the plan for which they were now in full expectation of success. What too must be our mortified situation, when we considered our long process, and when the happy moment of projection arrived, to see the bubble burst.

The minister, in his last desponding struggles, hit upon a pretty easy expedient, suitable to his great genius, to obtain still a war that might make a diversion.

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They had been trying all their arts and address, to involve the Dutch in a continent war at their own doors; but were absolutely refused. But now for our last recourse; without giving that cautious people any time to deliberate, we sent our transports with a commissary to Holland, to bring over 6000 of their troops, before ever we demanded them, or delivered the for ever extraordinary important memorial of the 13th of February, to the States-general. — Does the princes declaration of war allude to it — The Dutch prudently refused them; that not succeeding, nor a war of diversion to be obtained, the Empress negociated, and at last concluded her treaty with France.

They were so absorbed in despair and hopes for a month, that they could pay no regard to it, it must appear to us if there where any hopes, it would have been better to have sent a squadron sooner, than stay till they had none, for no orders were given for one till the begining of March, though the intelligence was strong and certain the beginning February, when the whole nation, as well as majesty himself, was justly apprehensive of our danger there. He very properly ordered all the officers of the

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garrison, immediately to repair to their post. The orders from the War-office are dated the 3d of February, application was made to the Admiralty for a man of war to carry them, the Revenge was appointed, yet it never occurred to them, the necessity of protecting it with a fleet, till some time afterward in March — Such has been the conduct of these renowned ministers — Yet the great struggle against the people for their restoration to power; from their known wisdom, abilities, bountifully rewarding of merit, and from the pure love of their past conduct — the blood of Byng is to atone for all negligences.

Thus was our late minister so bewildered in that endless chaos of German politics, and from whence alone he is still a darling favourite, that no attention was permitted to the glory, the honour, the commerce of this nation, or our possessions and dominions, the source of all our wealth, and the respectable figure we had hitherto made in Europe.

The danger of Minorca was known and dreaded in November; there are many evidences of it, as well as of the care, that was thought necessary for its preservation at
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that time ; in that only one important point, the sending of another general with a command there. — How late was the squadron appointed ; how was it manned ; how many ships more might have been sent — What was the condition of the ships — Can it be credited, that on the 21st of March, the admiral should receive a letter from the Admiralty, pressing the utmost dilligence, from the danger Minorca was in ; and as a proof of it, they sent him an extract of a letter from the Earl of Bristol, communicating a design of the French to make a descent there ; and yet not add one ship more to his squadron ; but instead of sending a greater force, they lessened that very force which they before designed to have sent ; by orders of the 25th of March, to disembark the marines. But above all, how absurd are the instructions and orders in every part ; could it be believed, if they ever thought of the danger of Minorca, they should not have taken care at the same time to send stores to Gibraltar, where every thing relative to naval affairs, except places, was totally obliterated ; where else could our Fleet be refitted or supplied ; could they possibly think, if the French attempted the siege of St. Philipp's, that the stores there and har-

hour of Mahone could have been of service to them.

I must add too a few observations on their riddling instructions, in which is slightly mentioned the danger of Minorca, as a vain amusement, since, in their own words, they say "advices which have been received relating to THE SUPPOSED INTENTION of the French to attack Minorca" and in another part say, "and as it is PROBABLE they may be designed for north America" which is further confirmed from the military department by the orders of the 28th of March to general Fowke; Sir, I am commanded by his majesty to acquaint you, in case the island of Minorca should be IN ANY LIKELIHOOD of being attacked, that it is his majesty's pleasure you cause a detachment equal to a battallion" &c. thus we see the one on the 30th of March is at last treated as a supposition, the other as a probability. And upon that foundation follows the strange stuff of orders about unmaning our fleet, when they had no marines on board, and finely concludes with them, ordering an inferior unmanned force to block up a greatly superior one in Toulon.

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It therefore plainly fully appears; that no credit was given to the strong repeated intelligences of the danger of Minorca, and their whole defence is now vainly, ridiculously to be placed on the panic they had created; and the strange terrifying intelligences of a French invasion, some of which at the very same time tells them, that it is designed only to alarm us; others at the very same time acquaint them of the equal apprehensions the French were under, their great preparations to defend and guard their own coast from us.

But we now read, that they place their defence on the undoubted intelligence they had received of plans formed by that terrible Planner Bellisle, without considering the time of the year, and no troops ready; but his name alone is sufficient. He and his plans were once ridiculously secured in the tower of Windsor, and we were shamefully obliged at last to dismiss him. But if it shall appear that the first intelligence they received that part of his plans were approved, was on the 19th of Febuary, how will they justifie themselves for sending the transports to Holland, and the delivering of Mr. York's famous memorial on the 13th,

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the day before they had received that intelligence here.

But Byng was to atone for all——What exulting triumphs in his blood were expressed; when mercy, facts, reason nor arguments were not to approach us; from thence with his execution, they have concluded, that they were to return with redoubled power, tacked by desperation, with bloody vengeance——I will not, I dread to mention, what alone can support their desperate thirst of power. This nation never can, ought, or will be satisfied without a strict enquiry into the ignominious negligent loss of Minorca. They justly demand and expect it from their representatives, where the innocent may be acquitted, and punishment immediately follow the sentence of the guilty; for they are enabled to judge of the unfortunate admiral Byng by his trial.

P O S T C R I P T.

Let it not be forgot that the national debt in 1726, was but fifty one millions; that the sinking-fund would have paid off the whole many a year since, except

cept a few long annuities; nor the numerous overburdensome taxes, with which we are since loaded; that our debt, including the two millions and a half to be borrowed this year, is eighty one millions — Then reflect on the causes that have thus exhausted us, thus reduced us to our present deplorable situation, and desperate crisis.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

PAGE 12, *for* in ployment, *r.* in employment. *P.* 30, *for* memorable bill, *r.* bell. *P.* 33, *for* must upon, *r.* must not upon. *P.* 35, *for* in every beginning, *r.* in the very. *P.* 38, *for* be be, *r.* be. *P.* 41, *for* the Prince's declaration, *r.* the French. *P.* 41, *for* to it, it, *r.* to Minorca, it. *P.* 42, *for* great strugle, *r.* great struggle is. *P.* 44, *for* deportment, *r.* department. *Ibid.* *for* concludes with them, *r.* concludes with. *P.* 45, *for* 19 of Feb. *r.* 14 of Feb. *P.* 46, *for* tacked by desparation, *r.* backed by desperation. *P.* 46, *for* in 1756, or 1726, *r.* in 1716.

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The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various offices of the Government of the State of New York, for the year 1880.

